In particular, as highly publicized allegations of corporate criminal wrongdoing are becoming more and more common, a lively public debate, fueled by the news media, has developed regarding the guilt and innocence of "corporate celebrities." Corporate criminal allegations have incited an upsurge in a form of advertising known as the corporate image campaign, which focuses not on the products or services a company offers, but on improving the public image of the corporation itself. 4 However, public denials of criminal allegations seemingly transcend categorization as mere corporate image campaigning. Where the speech of a commercial entity is a denial of criminal allegations, such speech should be more protected than typical low-value "commercial speech," like product advertising.
Both Martha Stewart and the Nike corporation have become embroiled in legal battles stemming from their potential liability for public statements made to defend against highly publicized allegations of criminal wrongdoing. 5 Potential liability in each case (securities fraud against Stewart and false advertising against Nike) stems from the fact that the commercial entity's denials may have affected the public's view of the corporation's business such that the speech has been categorized as lesser protected "commercial speech.", 6 These two distinct corporate personalities and the analogous legal difficulties they have encountered suggest that a burgeoning class of corporate defendants may require application of unique judicial rules to avoid liability for statements merely denying public allegations of criminal wrongdoing. So long as the current trend toward highly publicized white collar criminal prosecutions continues, this class of corporate defendants dwelling in the public eye will require some protection. Regulations directed at curbing misleading commercial speech, such as securities fraud regulations and false advertising laws, for example, must be revisited to protect corporations' and corporate personalities' First Amendment speech right, a right that should be at its peak when speech is offered in defense of allegations of criminal wrongdoing.
Policy considerations favor some form of unique treatment for corporate entities facing highly publicized criminal allegations. When corporate entities face civil liability (or even criminal conviction) for their denials of public criminal allegations, speech at the heart of the First Amendment is chilled. In particular, a commercial entity's interest in selfexpression is curtailed, and a valuable check on government overreach is circumvented. Moreover, by not permitting any response, the regulations on corporate speech may be unwittingly expressive on their own; silence in the face of criminal allegations may implicitly signal to the public a corporate entity's guilt or, at least, acceptance of the charges against them. Corporate entities and the investing and consuming public have strong interests in allowing the fullest dialogue possible on issues of corporate criminality. And because the government has available more narrowly tailored means of addressing problematic false statements made during the course of a criminal investigation and trial, such regulations of speech should not be permissible under the First Amendment.
This Comment proposes a narrow exception to the current doctrine regarding the low First Amendment protection for false or misleading commercial speech: commercial speakers whose speech rebuts public claims of criminal wrongdoing should not be held liable for claims stemming from the factual content of their denials, even if false or misleading. The basis for this exception is two-fold: that such speech is not in fact commercial and is thus afforded constitutional protection from rigorous regulation; 7 and that the right of a criminal defendant or accused to deny the allegations against him or her (and to buttress their denial with "modest factual claims") 8 outweighs the interest that the state has in regulating this narrow class of speech.
This Comment offers an initial review of the Nike and Martha Stewart cases (Part 1I) before addressing the current First Amendment jurisprudence (Part II.A), particularly as it pertains to commercial speech (Part III.B) and false and misleading speech (Part III.C). This Comment then argues that a commercial entity's public denial of criminal accusations does not constitute commercial speech (Part IV.A); that commercial entities and society each have strong interests in protecting public denials (Part IV.B); that the government interest in regulating such speech is low (Part IV.C); and, therefore, that regulation of such speech violates the First Amendment right of corporate speakers. Thus, this Comment concludes that a corporate entity should not be subject to liability stemming from the denial of public allegations of criminal wrongdoing, even if the denial is false or misleading.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND: NIKE v. KASKY AND UNITED STATES V. STEWART
The Nike corporation recently challenged its potential liability for statements made to defend against and rebut public allegations of human rights violations in its foreign factories. 9 Starting in 1996, Nike, a popular sporting goods company, was "besieged with a series of allegations that it was mistreating and underpaying workers at foreign facilities.'" In response to these public allegations, Nike sent press releases, wrote letters to the media and individuals (such as university officials), and commissioned a report on the conditions of Nike's foreign facilities, denying and discrediting the public allegations." Based on these public denials, a California resident sued Nike under California's Unfair Competition Law and False Advertising Law, 2 alleging that Nike made false public statements and omitted facts regarding poor working conditions in order to "maintain and/or increase its sales."' 3 The trial court dismissed the suit on First and Fourteenth Amendment grounds, on motion by Nike.' 4 The California Court of Appeals affirmed, but the California Supreme Court reversed and remanded on the ground that Nike's commercial speech is not afforded substantial First Amendment protection. 5 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to address two issues: (1) whether corporate speech as part of a public debate can be the basis of liability for factual inaccuracies, because such speech may affect consumer opinions of the business as a "good corporate citizen" and thus may be characterized as commercial speech; and (2) whether, assuming such speech is commercial, the First Amendment permits the regulation of Nike's speech.' 6 However, because the Supreme Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted, I " the issue has not been finally resolved.
Even more troubling is the securities fraud case recently brought against Martha Stewart, home-making maven, chief executive officer,'" and chairman of the board of directors 9 of Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia (MSLO). 20 In June of 2002, Stewart faced an onslaught of public interest and media coverage regarding her potential involvement in an insider trading scandal. 2 ' On December 27, 2001, Stewart sold her 3,928 shares of ImClone Systems Incorporated, a medicine developer.
Stewart was widely and publicly accused of selling her shares based on her alleged receipt of nonpublic information the day before the FDA announced its refusal to license Erbitux, ImClone's lead medicinal development, 23 though no formal charges of insider trading had been brought (and never were brought) against Stewart. 2 4 The story of Stewart's involvement with the ImClone scandal was published in both the Associated Press and the New York Times, relying on statements from "people close to a Congressional investigation., 2 5 Less than a week later, a Congressman professed to a national television audience his belief that Stewart was guilty of insider 17 id. 18 Stewart is now the former chief executive officer of MSLO, since she resigned from this position during the course of the events described.
19 Interestingly, another "hat" that Stewart once wore was that of securities broker. Employment of manipulative and deceptive devices. It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails publishing "a series of false and misleading public statements during June 2002 regarding her sale of ImClone stock" in "an effort to stop or at least slow the steady erosion of MSLO's stock price caused by investor concerns" (hereinafter, Count Nine). 36 The criminal case against Stewart went to trial. 37 Significantly, prior to trial Stewart moved to dismiss Count Nine based on a First Amendment defense, among others. 3 " While admitting that Count Nine was a novel approach to the securities laws, the court did not dismiss Count Nine and later held that Stewart could not argue at trial the potential First Amendment problem posed by Count Nine. 39 Rather, the court ruled as a matter of law that Count Nine poses no First Amendment or of any facility of any national securities exchange, (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a materialfact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. Yet under the regime urged by the government, it may indict a defendant, then indict her again for publicly challenging the first indictment. That is frightening. Count Nine is so far beyond our constitutional tradition that the government failed to find any case in the history of this country in which a person was prosecuted for asserting, explaining, or expressing her own innocence. We hope this will not be the first. 4 ' After weeks of trial, the court ultimately determined that the evidence presented was insufficient to support a finding of guilt on Count Nine and granted Stewart's motion for acquittal. 42 Specifically, the court held that the Government had not proved with sufficient evidence that Stewart had the requisite criminal intent to deceive investors and artificially inflate her stock price by making the statements for which she was charged with securities fraud. 43 In other words, to reach a conclusion of criminal guilt on Count Nine, the jury would have to impermissibly speculate about Stewart's intent. 44 The court's decision, however, turned on the high burden that the Government faces in proving the elements of the criminal offense of securities fraud beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. (emphasis added

Id
4 ' The court suggested that the evidence presented would have been sufficient to withstand a motion for judgment as a matter of law (and thus would go to the jury) if the charges were civil rather than criminal. The court stated: This is one of those rare cases in which the standard of proof makes a difference in the assessment of the sufficiency of the evidence. The Government argues, in effect, that evidentiary sufficiency is the same in civil and criminal securities fraud cases. However, the law is to the contrary.... The issue at hand is... whether, taking into account the heightened standard of proof in criminal cases, there is sufficient evidence of Stewart's intent to deceive investors to present the matter to the jury. content. 67 Then in a series of opinions in the 1960s and 1970s, the Court recognized that speech cannot be entirely denied First Amendment protection because the speech is "on a commercial subject., 68 However, the First Amendment protection afforded commercial speech continues to be less than the protection of other more valued speech.
Policy behind limited protection for commercial speech
Essentially three rationales have been offered for the lowered level of protection for commercial speech: the hardiness of commercial speech, the low contribution of commercial speech to the forum of ideas, and a heightened need and capability to ensure accuracy of commercial speech.
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First of all, because commercial speech serves an economic interest, such speech is seen as hardy and not likely to be crushed by overbroad regulation. 7° Because commercial messages are generally calculated, regulations of commercial speech also do not inhibit spontaneous speech, which is viewed as more likely to be chilled. 7 ' Also, the Court views commercial speech and, in particular, advertising as contributing less to the interchange of ideas and thus less likely to foster intense media scrutiny or discussion. Commercial speech contributes not to the interchange of ideas, but to "private economic decision making and public allocation of resources. 7 2 Because of its low value as a contributor to the forum of ideas, commercial speech is more fitting for intense regulation. 73 The Court has attempted to draw a bright line between commercial and noncommercial speech out of fear that the low protection of commercial speech would dilute the protection afforded more high-value speech. (1978)) ("To require a parity of constitutional protection for commercial and noncommercial speech alike could invite dilution, simply by a leveling process, of the force of the Amendment's guarantee with respect to the latter kind of speech.").
The fact that commercial speech is not part of the forum of ideas, or is more economic than philosophical, heightens the government's interest in accuracy because the limited potential for public discussion or scrutiny suggests that false statements will not be weeded out and rejected in the public marketplace. 7 5 Because advertisements are viewed as uniquely likely to deceive or confuse, content-based restrictions in the commercial context are more permissible. 76 Additionally, the topic of commercial speech is generally goods and services, which are tangible and thus more susceptible to empirical analysis." 7 Commercial speakers also have the opportunity to ensure accuracy because a commercial entity typically engages in advance planning before making commercial speech (i.e., before publishing an advertisement). 7 8 Thus, because commercial speakers are in a position to have high knowledge of their products or services and the market, they are in a good position to evaluate and verify the accuracy of their messages and should be held more accountable for any inaccuracies. 7 9
Defining commercial speech
The Supreme Court has attempted to define less-protected commercial speech on several occasions because the classification of speech as commercial or noncommercial is a threshold issue in determining the standard to be applied to regulations of speech. 80 While the prototypical commercial speech is product or service advertising, s the Court has held that other representations by commercial entities, such as press releases and public letters, also can constitute commercial speech."
The Court has applied several standards for distinguishing commercial speech from noncommercial speech based on content, and the four most prominent standards are discussed here. a. Commercial speech does "no more than propose a commercial transaction. ' 83 Most typically, commercial speech is defined as speech that does no more than propose a commercial transaction and thus falls under a tradition of government regulation. 84 In fact, in Board of Trustees of the State University of New York v. Fox, the Court stated clearly, succinctly, and narrowly that whether speech "propose[s] a commercial transaction" is "the test for identifying commercial speech. ' 5 The Court has described this distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech as one of "commonsense," 8 6 where commercial speech, intuitively, is speech "linked inextricably to commercial activity. ' 7 The Court has also stated that "speech that has a purpose above and beyond 'mere solicitation of patronage' should be treated differently" than speech merely proposing a commercial transaction. 88 b. Speech that furthers the speaker's economic interests or is promotional in nature is commercial speech.
Similarly, the Court has defined commercial speech based on the speaker's economic motivation or potential for economic gain. Commercial speech has been defined as "expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience.' ' 8 9
Similarly, commercial speech has been defined as representations that are promotional-statements that serve to benefit the speaker's economic interests, by increasing sales, for example. 90 To emphasize, under this standard the purpose of the speech must be solely economic in order to afford the speech lesser First Amendment protection; speech is not rendered commercial by the fact that the speech serves, among other things, an economic interest. 9 1 c. The Bolger test for commercial speech Application of these "commonsense" and economic impact standards, however, has proven more complicated. In particular, deciding which standard to apply becomes murky where a commercial speaker speaks on an issue of public concern. In that context, the two standards discussed thus far yield contradictory results: statements on an issue of public debate, where the issue is related to the business of a commercial speaker, may be economically beneficial to the speaker despite the fact that the speech does 92 not in any way propose a commercial transaction or solicit patronage. Perhaps because of the difficulty of categorizing expression of this type, the Court articulated a three-part test for identifying commercial speech in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp. 93 There, the Court concluded that informational pamphlets published by the maker of Trojan condoms discussing the benefits of condoms and the dangers of sexually transmitted diseases were commercial speech. 94 The Court so found based on the presence of three factors "in combination": advertising format, explicit product reference, and economic motivation. 95 In Bolger, the speaker conceded that the pamphlets were advertisements. 96 Further, the pamphlets contained numerous references to condoms, the speaker's product, and no doubt encouraged the use of such prophylactics, thereby increasing the sales of condoms made by Trojan, the market leader. 97 While the Court found that neither of these factors was determinative in isolation, the three elements combined to qualify the pamphlets as lesser protected commercial speech. 98 Having met these three factors, the fact that the pamphlets also 91 In fact, the Court has stated that "some of our most valued forms of fully protected speech are uttered for a profit." Bd. Finally, the Court has stated that where commercial speech and "pure speech" are "inextricably intertwined," the categorization of the speech must turn on "the nature of the speech taken as a whole."' 0 Thus, expression that serves a substantial noncommercial purpose but has an incidental commercial effect may be considered noncommercial for the purpose of analysis. 1 ' This definition indicates that where commercial statements by a commercial speaker also include speech on issues of public importance, other interests may be served, rendering the speech noncommercial. However, this rule, first articulated in Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, Inc.,102 has thus far been applied sparingly. Courts have rejected use of this definition to expand the protection for commercial elements of speech where "[n]o law of man or of nature makes it impossible" to separate the commercial and noncommercial elements of the speech. 0 3 Where the commercial aspect of speech can be expressed wholly independent of the noncommercial speech, and vice versa, the Riley rule affords no heightened protection. 104
Some speech by a commercial entity is noncommercial.
A significant and foundational point (that bears repeating) is that the limited protection of commercial speech hinges on an equally applicable protection for noncommercial speech by a commercial entity. The Court has recognized that speech by a commercial entity can be noncommercial speech on an issue of public concern, which is deserving of protection against over-regulation. In so doing, the Court reiterated that commercial speakers are afforded First Amendment protection and explicitly rejected the contention that the utility company's speech was less protected based on the speaker's identity. 1 0 8
Commercial speech can be permissibly subject to strict regulation only because the Court has recognized that a commercial entity can speak in a non-commercial capacity on an issue of public interest and that such speech is fully protected. 0 9 Thus, underlying the limited First Amendment protection for commercial speech is the premise that there are other, protected avenues of speech for corporate speakers.
Limited protection afforded commercial speech
Incidentally, despite the limited protection that commercial speech receives, the Court has maintained that restrictions on commercial speech cannot be applied haphazardly. Even where speech is deemed commercial, the expression is entitled to "qualified but nonetheless substantial protection."" 0 For example, in Bolger, the Court found the pamphlet on the topic of condoms and venereal disease to be protected under the First Amendment, despite its status as commercial speech."' The Court held that the sweeping restriction on the mailing of unsolicited advertisements for 106 Id. at 544. contraceptives was not justified, such that even the limited protection afforded commercial speech was infringed.) 2 Thus, "[t]he application of... [a commercial speech restriction] must be examined carefully to ensure that speech deserving of greater constitutional protection is not inadvertently suppressed."" ' 3 For this reason, the party seeking to uphold a restriction on commercial speech must carry the burden of justifying the restriction. 14 While the protection afforded commercial speech has been limited to speech that is not false or misleading," 5 the fear that overregulation of commercial speech will chill high-value speech is equally relevant in the context of regulations of false or misleading speech, particularly in the context of corporate criminal denials.
C. FALSE OR MISLEADING SPEECH
The Supreme Court once stated that "there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact." ' " 6 Since then, however, the Court has hedged this initially blanket statement. 117 The Court has struck down regulations against false speech on matters of public concern to allow "breathing room" for constitutionally protected speech."' So as not to curtail high-value speech, "the Court has been willing to insulate even demonstrably false speech from liability."" 9 Moreover, the Court has consistently referred back to the idea that false statements should not be regulated by the government, but instead The commercial marketplace, like other spheres of our social and cultural life, provides a forum where ideas and information flourish .... [T] he general rule is that the speaker and the audience, not the government, assess the value of the information presented. Thus, even a communication that does no more than propose a commercial transaction is entitled to the coverage of the First Amendment.
Fane, 507 U.S. at 767. weeded out in the marketplace of ideas.' 20 Justice Holmes once stated that "the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market., 1 2 ' This has time again been rearticulated in various permutations by the Court, the most significant of which is the oft repeated adage that "the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones."' 22 Under this theory, the government should not censor false statements, but instead should allow the fullest protection of uninhibited speech so that false statements can in time be countered and contradicted by other (perhaps true) statements. ' The marketplace of ideas concept relies on an assumption that the general public is sufficiently sophisticated to distinguish falsities from truths, assuming that enough information is available to them.
However, in presuming that Stewart's and Nike's denials were false or misleading, whether the denials are classified as commercial or noncommercial speech becomes particularly significant to the analysis. Despite the concerns occasionally expressed by some commentators, false or misleading commercial speech has undoubtedly been subject to permissible government regulation. 24 misleading noncommercial speech, like speech on matters of public concern, may be protected just as other high-value speech is protected. 128 To be clear, the State's interests in the regulation of certain commercial speech is not to be understated, particularly where the commercial speech is false or misleading. Regulation of such speech serves as a protection for listeners, who have "little interest in receiving false, misleading, or deceptive commercial information.' ' 129 Regulation of commercial speech permits the government to ensure the presentation of accurate product information to consumers and thorough corporate disclosures to investors.
Of course, the counter-argument to such government control is, again, that "to the extent that regulation makes government the chief editor of information disseminated to investors ... the regulatory structure seems more consonant with 'authoritative selection"' than with the core First Amendment value of a thriving marketplace of ideas.
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In noncommercial contexts, however, the Court has held that speech on public issues requires 'breathing space'-potentially incorporating certain false or misleading speech-in order to survive.' 3 One major difficulty with the commercial speech doctrine, evidenced by corporate criminal denials, is "the difficulty of drawing bright lines that will clearly cabin commercial speech in a distinct category.' ' 137 Corporate public statements of defense are particularly difficult to categorize, yet classification of such speech as either commercial or non-commercial is required under the current jurisprudence. 
Identity as a commercial entity is insufficient to qualify speech as commercial.
In classifying statements like those made by Martha Stewart and Nike as either commercial or noncommercial, the fact that the speaker has a corporate identity is not dispositive. The Court has stated that the identity of the speaker is not relevant to determining whether speech is commercial. 1 3 9 Thus, the fact that Nike and Martha Stewart are, or are affiliated with, corporate entities does not make their speech necessarily 136 Obviously, while Stewart's and Nike's denials are analyzed similarly here, the situations they faced and the statements they made were not identical. Nike was never formally charged with the working conditions violations of which it was publicly accused in its capacity as a corporation. Conversely, Martha Stewart was formally investigated for insider trading in her capacity as an individual, though her standing as the public figurehead of her corporation makes this distinction less determinative. Given these differences and the liability exception this Comment proposes, Stewart should certainly have a First Amendment defense to liability stemming from her statements of denial. Less obviously, but equally included in the exception proposed here, Nike should also have a First Amendment defense to statements of defense made in its corporate capacity. 144 Stewart Indictment, supra note 19, at 37-40. The Indictment lists three categories of statements made by Stewart from which the securities fraud charge stems. (I) On June 7, 2002, Stewart issued a statement through her attorney, published in the Wall Street Journal, regarding her sale: "The sale was executed because Ms. Stewart had a predetermined price at which she planned to sell the stock. That determination, made more than a month before that trade, was to sell if the stock ever went less than $60." (2) On June 12, 2002, following the arrest of Samuel Waksal, Stewart prepared and issued a public statement reiterating her stop-loss agreement, stating that on December 27, 2001, she had returned a phone call from statements did not in any way invite commercial dealings, as would be the case if she had promoted specific products. Moreover, Stewart's statements leading to Count Nine were not even "the typical stuff of securities fraud actions: false statements about earnings, or revenue, new product lines, or issuance of government licenses or approvals.' 4 5 Stewart merely spoke on her own behalf, rather than on behalf of her corporation, in response to publicly released criminal allegations against her.
Stewart's public statements essentially stated, "I am innocent, your charges are false, here is why."' 146 Stewart's purpose was merely to deny the public allegations and to give her side of the story; if Stewart had any economic motivation, this was secondary to clearing her own name. 14 7
Under the Court's jurisprudence, if Stewart's speech had a purpose above and beyond "mere solicitation of patronage"' 148 and was not solely motivated by the economic interests of herself and the listening public, 149 her speech should not be considered commercial for the purpose of First Amendment analysis merely because she is a figurehead of a corporation.
Nike's statements 50 also did not propose a commercial transaction and were not motivated solely by economic interests. Rather, Nike dedicated the text of its statements and letters to refuting the allegations that Nike's her broker regarding the fact that the price had fallen below $60, and assuring that her trade had not been based on nonpublic information. 147 See Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, supra note 26, at 13 ("That statements defending Ms. Stewart's innocence were made throughout that period is perfectly consistent with an intent to protect her personal reputation from false accusations.").
148 Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 13 n.10 (1979). 149 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980) (defining commercial speech as "expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience").
'5o The Kasky complaint alleges that Nike made six false statements: (I) that its products are manufactured in compliance with applicable local laws and regulations governing wages and working hours; (2) that the average line-workers in the factories are paid double the applicable local minimum wage; (3) that the workers receive free meals and health care; (4) that Nike 'guarantee[s] a living-wage for all workers'; (5) that the workers are protected from corporal punishment and abuse; (6) that working conditions in the factories are in compliance with applicable local laws and regulations governing occupational health-and-safety and environmental standards. 53 In Bolger, the Court held that speech constitutes commercial speech, despite the inclusion of speech on matters of public importance, where the speech (1) is an advertisement, (2) explicitly refers to the speaker's product, and (3) is economically motivated. 54 Even presuming some level of economic motivation for their denials, the statements offered by Nike and Stewart were not advertisements and did not refer to their products at all.
The Court has found that speech need not closely resemble a typical advertisement to be commercial, such that press releases or public letters can constitute commercial speech. 55 However, the Bolger test does rely on the typical advertising format, in combination with the two other elements, as a yardstick by which to gauge the commercial nature of speech. 156 Note that this is in direct contradiction to the aforementioned test. The Court has been contradictory on this point.
Stewart's and Nike's denials cannot be classified as typical advertisements. In his dissenting opinion in Nike v. Kasky, Justice Breyer found relevant the fact that Nike's statements "appear[ed] outside a traditional advertising format, such as a brief television or newspaper advertisement."' 7 Rather, Nike's statements were made in the form of various press releases, letters to newspaper editors and certain individuals (such as university deans and athletic directors)., 58 Similarly, Martha Stewart's denials were in the form of press releases, direct comment to the Wall Street Journal, and a press release read aloud by Stewart as a preface to her presentation on MSLO at an investors' meeting.' 59 These are not the typical fora of advertisements; if advertisement is defined broadly enough to encompass Nike's and Stewart's statements under the Bolger test, commercial speech that wouldn't constitute advertisement is difficult to imagine.
Further, neither Stewart nor Nike made reference to any of their particular products in their statements of denial.
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Stewart made no reference to any of her company's magazines, household or crafts items, or television programs. Nike's statements included no reference to specific sporting goods, but instead focused on the conditions of its foreign manufacturing facilities. Thus, even if Stewart and Nike had some economic motivation for denying the criminal allegations against them, their denials do not constitute commercial speech under the Bolger test.
c. Finally, even if part of Martha Stewart's and Nike's speech is commercial, the commercial and noncommercial aspects are inextricably intertwined, such that speech must be analyzed as noncommercial.
In Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, the Court stated that, where commercial speech and "pure speech" are "inextricably intertwined," such that the two categories of speech cannot be separated, the speech must be analyzed as noncommercial. 6 ' This is a narrow category, and courts have declined to apply this rule of analysis where the commercial and noncommercial elements of the speech are at all separable.
allegations, the Riley rule should apply because the commercial and noncommercial elements of the speech are in fact inextricably intertwined. In SUNY, the Court upheld a restriction on the marketing of products in campus dormitories and rejected the contention that the sale of housewares was "inextricably intertwined" with noncommercial lessons in home economics. 163 The Court stated that "[n]o law of man or nature makes it impossible to sell housewares without teaching home economics, or to teach home economics without selling housewares."' 64 The Court recognized that the expression of noncommercial messages should not be limited, but found that the noncommercial message at issue, a home economics lesson, did not have to be combined with the commercial message, the sale of housewares, in order to be conveyed.1 65 In Semco v. Amcast, the Sixth Circuit similarly rejected a Riley contention, also offered in an attempt to heighten the protection for commercial speech under a different set of facts.
16 6 In Semco, an article published on the manufacturing process for "plunger tips" also contained explicit references to the author company's products. 67 The Court held that the two categories of speech were not inextricably intertwined, because an article could feasibly discuss the manufacturing process without referring to a particular brand of products; likewise, the particular brand could be advertised independent of the manufacturing process publication. 68 However, the issue of corporate criminal denials is distinguishable from the facts in both Semco and SUNY, and the Riley rule should be applied here. If corporate denials have an element of commercial speech because of their potential economic motivation and impact, this commercial element is "inextricably intertwined" with the noncommercial element of such speech, that of offering a denial to public criminal allegations. 69 Put differently, here a "law of man or nature makes it impossible" to deny allegations of corporate criminal wrongdoing without also making statements potentially beneficial to the corporation's bottom line. Denial of criminal allegations will most often have an economically beneficial effect on the speaker when the speaker is in the business of profit-making. Because of this catch-22, even if Nike's and Martha Stewart's statements were motivated in part by a desire to promote their corporation or their products, 1 70 the Riley exception should apply in the narrow case of the factual claims asserted as a criminal denial.
In his dissenting opinion in Nike v. Kasky, Justice Breyer1 7 1 found that Nike's statements were not purely commercial.1 7 2
Rather, Breyer stated that Nike's public statements, such as the letters written by Nike, are a "mixture of commercial and noncommercial (public-issue-oriented) elements"; he cited to Riley and concluded that the speech should receive more protection than that afforded mere commercial speech.
173 Justice Breyer cited three factors that were relevant to his determination that the speech contained predominant noncommercial elements: the statements were made outside the traditional advertising format; the statements conveyed information to a diverse audience, including those with a mere curiosity about the public controversy; and the content of the statements clearly concerned a "matter .. .of significant public interest and active controversy."'1 7 4 Again, the statements made by Stewart and Nike were not published in the typical advertising format.1 7 5 The statements were made to the general public via the media and to private individuals. Each of the statements concerned a topic of heated debate and public curiosity. That these criteria are met suggests that there is at least a noncommercial element to their denials.
Practicality also supports the view that corporate denials are at least partially noncommercial. If Martha Stewart's personal denial of criminal 170 While neither Nike nor Martha Stewart made direct reference to their corporations' products in their public statements, "a company with sufficient control of the market for a product may be able to promote the product without reference to its own brand names." Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 67 (1983); see also Nat'l Comm'n. on Egg Nutrition v. FTC, 570 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1977). This rationale almost certainly applies to Nike, whose presence in the sporting goods market is undeniably significant. This rationale may also extend to Stewart's identity as a spokesperson for her brand, because Stewart arguably sells products by selling her own image. Thus, her own self-defense/selfpromotion may be seen as promoting her corporation, Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia. 
Regulation of corporate denials is inconsistent with the rationales offered for commercial speech regulation.
Because the rationales offered for lesser protection of commercial speech are inapplicable to commercial entities' statements of defense, as a matter of policy such speech should not be afforded the lesser First Amendment protection of typical commercial speech.
a. The government seeks to ensure the accuracy of statements to consumers.
The government has a diminished interest in ensuring the accuracy of speech like Nike's and Martha Stewart's denials, because the speech is on a topic of contemporary public debate, rather than tangible goods and services.
7 6 The government regulates the accuracy of commercial speech because the accuracy of such speech is readily ascertainable by the speaker and such speech is unlikely to fuel the sort of debate that could selfmonitor, or weed out, false statements. While the statements by Stewart and Nike did not pertain to tangible goods and services, their accuracy was arguably readily ascertainable. Their denials, of course, were not capable of the type of regulatory empirical analysis that could ensure the accuracy of factual statements about Air Jordans or 250-thread count bed sheets, but Stewart and Nike both knew whether their statements of innocence were true or false. Admittedly, commercial speakers are in the best position to evaluate the accuracy of their statements of innocence. However, that a public debate regarding their guilt was ongoing suggests that Stewart's and Nike's statements were different than mere commercial advertising in their need to be regulated for accuracy. Whereas typical commercial speech, such as advertising, is seen as less likely to provoke public scrutiny and discussion, Nike and Martha Stewart were responding as part of a public debate that was already ongoing. Their statements were direct contributions to the interchange of ideas that was in progress regarding their allegedly criminal activities. Undoubtedly, the climate of public interest into which corporate criminal denials enter is unique; Stewart's and Nike's statements peaked the public's interest like no statement promoting household or sporting goods could. Such a context of public interest and debate is one where the fitting remedy for "evil counsels" should not be censorship or liability, but additional "good counsels.'
178 Essentially, where speech is likely to garner public interest and foster public debate, the truth or falsity of such speech should be addressed through the scrutiny of a functioning marketplace of ideas; in the mere advertising context, such a marketplace doesn't exist, prompting the government to regulate the truth of commercial speech. Thus, the accuracy rationale for regulating commercial speech should not apply to corporate criminal denials.
b. The hardiness of commercial speech negates the danger from overregulation.
Statements like those made by Nike and Martha Stewart are not the kind of "hardy" commercial speech that can withstand being crushed or chilled by overbroad regulation. Rather, there is a great risk that corporate denials will be completely chilled by the fear of liability under securities or false advertising laws.
179 "Hardy" commercial speech is "the offspring of economic self-interest.' ' 80 The denial of criminal allegations is not a hardy 178 See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 457 (1978) (stating that the adage is ineffective as applied to mere advertisements, communications that are less public debate and more one-way); see also supra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
179 Nike, 539 U.S. at 680 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("Uncertainty about how a court will view these, or other, statements, can easily chill a speaker's efforts to engage in public debate....").
1S0 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564 n.6 (1980). Yet any corporate act can be said to be in the corporation's economic selfinterest. If we are willing to define commercial speech so broadly, no statement by a corporate actor or entity would receive First Amendment protection, a position rejected by prior caselaw. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 766 (1978) form of speech in the vein of purely economic interests; rather, such speech is a sensitive response to an attack on one's personal (or corporate) innocence and autonomy. Because corporate denials at least possibly serve non-economic goals, such as the simple desire to defend oneself against criminal accusations, corporate denials are more sensitive to over-regulation and more likely to be chilled than commercial, purely economic speech.
c. Commercial speech is considered less valuable'' and thus more appropriately subject to regulation.
Where denials by commercial entities address an issue of ongoing public debate, such speech is a valuable contribution to the forum of ideas.' 82 The statements made by Stewart and Nike are distinguishable from typical commercial speech, like product advertisements, because they are speech on a matter of public concern. The intense media scrutiny and repeated editorializing suggest that Nike's employment practices and Stewart's involvement in the ImClone scandal were subjects in which the public was interested. Particularly when made by highly public entities, denials of criminal wrongdoing are properly classified as aids in the search for truth and the advancement of self-expression, and should be valued highly. The type of expression exercised by Martha Stewart and Nike is of high First Amendment value and is inconsistent with the low protection afforded mere commercial speech. Typical commercial speech lacks the communicative value of fully protected speech to both the speaker and society. 184 Here, however, the interests of speaker, listeners, and society in general suggest that such speech should be protected.
(protecting corporate speech in the form of political contributions as speech that "lies at the heart of the First Amendment's protection").
"" The right of a criminal defendant to deny allegations against him is a speech right at the heart of the First Amendment, since it ensures complete citizen autonomy, accords with constitutional protections afforded criminal defendants, and protects against an overreaching government. The First Amendment has been recognized as a crucial means of enforcement for "constitutionally guaranteed and other rights."' ' 85 An individual (or a corporation) has a recognized interest in self-expression'1 6 that should extend to the right to deny criminal allegations that serve to damage one's public reputation. Self-expression, or contributing one's ideas to the public debate of an issue, 18 7 seems particularly critical when the source of public debate is the speaker herself. And when the debate concerns the speaker's involvement in criminal activity, the interest in self-expression is even higher, as criminality reflects extremely negatively upon both individual and corporate defendants.
Further, a corporate speaker should have a right to deny the public allegations made against him because silence in the face of public criticism may signal acceptance of the allegations and imply guilt.' 88 This runs counter to the spirit of our constitutional protections for criminal defendants, in particular the Fifth Amendment proscription of compelling a witness to testify against himself.' 8 9 In addition, in light of our nation's criminal jurisprudence requiring that defendants are innocent until proven guilty' 90 and the requirement of due process of law,' 9 ' any statement made by a defendant or accused must be allowed full breathing space so as not to be chilled. Particularly where the allegations are so highly publicized, the nearly reciprocal denial of such allegations, 192 as made by Martha Stewart and Nike, must be protected to preserve the ability to deny criminal allegations and assert, via the First Amendment, one's constitutional and other rights.' 93 Without such protection, "profound reticence to speak on social, political, or moral issues" would be consequentially "instill[ed] in commercial entities" facing criminal allegations. 94 Significantly, protection for criminal denials serves as a check on government overreach, one of the significant interests served by the First Amendment. "'The freedom of individuals to verbally oppose or challenge' government action without criminal consequence 'is one of the principal characteristics by which we distinguish a free nation from a police state." 9 5 A quintessential check on government overreach is the right of a criminal defendant to rebut the charges of criminality and draw public attention to the government's potentially arbitrary exertion of force over the defendant.
1 96 In particular, the government's imposition of liability or criminality based on statements of defense seems like a precariously slippery slope 97 that should be avoided altogether.
Listeners also have an interest in a corporate entity's statements of defense, just as they have an interest in hearing any idea in the marketplace. Modern First Amendment jurisprudence reflects the idea of a "free" marketplace of ideas, where citizens benefit from having as much information available to them as possible.' 9 8 Just as a corporate defendant has a particular interest in engaging in the public debate about her own criminality, listeners have a heightened interest in hearing from the defendant herself. Input from persons intimately involved in an issue of public debate should be crucial to that debate.' 99 Regulation of speech on matters of public importance is reminiscent of the social paternalism rejected by years of First Amendment interpretation. 2°0 Listeners should receive information from both "sides" in the case of criminal wrongdoing. 2 1 Allowing the accuser to speak, but requiring the accused to remain silent or face liability, may be misleading to consumers or investors in and of itself. While society has an interest in both the promulgation of commercial 2 0 3 and noncommercial speech, this interest is at its peak when the speech is noncommercial and on a matter of public concern. When criminal allegations against a public figure become a matter of public debate, a thriving marketplace of ideas requires permission to respond without threat of liability, even if the response is false. The type of speech that criminal allegations foster is the type of speech that puts a check on government overreaching by questioning the sufficiency of the government's claims. By limiting the types of speakers who can respond to such allegations and instilling a fear of liability for denials, important speech is chilled 20 4 and critical First Amendment goals go underserved.°5
C. THE GOVERNMENT'S INTEREST IN REGULATING COMMERCIAL ENTITIES' PUBLIC DENIALS IS LOW.
Furthermore, the government has a low interest in protecting consumers or investors and has other means of regulating any potentially harmful speech by commercial defendants. Because denials of criminal wrongdoing are viewed as de rigueur, such speech, even if false, should not have much of an impact on the market. 0 6 Such speech may be disregarded by consumers and investors as mere "puffery"; the listener may be better informed of a statement's possible falsity and may even expect and question the accuracy of a corporate defendants' denial. 20 7 Thus, the government is overly paternalistic when it "assume[s] that consumers lack the ability or sophistication to decide for themselves whether a company's image reflects reality, or whether that image should influence their purchasing decisions at all. , ,20 8
In addition, the government has other means of dealing with false statements by corporate defendants. An obstruction of justice charge may be brought to curtail or punish false statements made in the course of an investigation. 0 9 In particular, Martha Stewart's later convictions, after the charge of securities fraud was dismissed, prove that the government has other avenues to successfully pursue that would accomplish its legitimate goals. 1 o Further, false statements made in court can, of course, be punished with a charge of perjury. 21 1 Lastly, if out-of-court public statements are seen as potentially problematic, the court can issue a gag order preventing all parties from issuing public statements, such that the public discourse will not be unfairly one-sided. 
V. CONCLUSION
Regulations imposed on speech on matters of public importance must serve government interests that outweigh the interests being infringed.
13
Because the interests supporting a corporate entity's right to deny criminal allegations are strong, and the government interest in regulating the content of such statements is low, regulation of speech denying criminal allegations violates the First Amendment. The state should not be able to impose a financial disincentive or, even worse, the possibility of imprisonment, to 206 Dennis & Boyden, supra note 8, at 3. 207 Id. at 4 ("The securities laws presume that investors are able to dismiss 'puffery'-vaguely optimistic statements about the future-and to anticipate obvious risks that are part and parcel of the business they are investing in."). The same could be said of consumers making purchasing decisions in response to defenses like that offered by Nike. corporate actors who wish to respond to criminal allegations. 2t 4 At the least, criminal denials by commercial entities are comprised of both commercial and noncommercial content, rendering them subject to analysis as noncommercial speech. 1 5 If statements made by Nike and Martha Stewart are classified as commercial speech (and thus receive lesser First Amendment protection), commercial speakers will fear liability for making any public statement denying criminal allegations. This type of speech, however, should receive the utmost First Amendment protection given our nation's emphasis on protections for criminal defendants and the high value of speech that ensures against government overreach (here, in the decision to prosecute or grant legislative permission for an individual to act as quasiprosecutor).
1 6 Criminal denials cannot be classified as purely commercial, and the interests of society and of corporate speakers outweigh the government's interest in regulating speech of this kind.
The exception proposed here is narrow, such that the risk of dilution of other speech protections is low. Only where the corporate statement is a public denial and refutation of criminal allegations should false or misleading speech be insulated from regulation. 21 7 The exception proposed here does little to change prior decisions and allows for flexibility of speech protection for an emerging class of highly public corporate criminal defendants.
A corporate criminal defendant should not be denied the fundamental protections our nation gives to all criminal defendants. By restricting the speech a corporate actor can express, the state must be cautious not to restrict any protected speech. The denial of criminal allegations is speech at the heart of the First Amendment; such speech fosters citizen autonomy and self-expression, as well as the more overarching marketplace of ideas. 21 8 Further, such denials limit the reach of the government by opening up government actions to public debate. Where, as in the context discussed 214 Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 664 (2003) ("Knowledgeable 'persons should be free to participate in [a debate about important public issues] without fear of unfair reprisal. The interest in protecting such participants from the chilling effect of the prospect of expensive litigation is therefore also a matter of great importance."); see also supra notes 38-44 (regarding Martha Stewart's defense of the criminal securities fraud charge). The fact that this imbalance is felt solely by commercial entities under certain speech regulations makes corporate speakers less likely to make statements on their own behalf than private/individual criminal defendants who fear no such liability.
21 5 Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781 (1988) . 216 The First Amendment is available to enforce these rights. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428-29 (1963) .
217 See supra note 192 for an example of the factually reciprocal type of criminal denial that would be afforded protection under the exception proposed here.
218 See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
here, the matter is already one of public debate because of the prominence of the corporate defendant, restrictions on the defensive statements a corporation can make limit unnecessarily the marketplace of ideas to a onesided debate. The caution necessary to avoid suppressing protected speech requires an exception to securities fraud, false advertising, or similar laws imposing liability on corporate speakers in the limited context proposed here. Where a corporate figure denies public allegations of criminal wrongdoing, such speech should be protected under the First Amendment, even if factual statements are false or misleading, to provide "breathing space" for highvalue criminal denials. Thus, the interest a criminal defendant has in denying criminal allegations is a unique and narrow defense "so pure as to countenance securities fraud," false advertising, or similar liability stemming from public factual statements of defense. 1 9
